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The Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on Patterns 
of Support for Democracy in Germany 
Hans-Dieter Klingemann ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Auswirkungen der Weltwirtschaftskrise auf die Muster von De-
mokratieunterstützung in Deutschland«. Has there been a decline in support 
for democracy in the aftermath of the 2007/08 fiscal crisis and the subsequent 
economic recession in Germany? This is the general research question dealt 
with in this article. Based on a differentiated theory of support for democracy 
results show that levels of support are high and change over time does not 
support the decline expectation. We conclude that the political culture of Ger-
many’s established democratic political regime has cushioned the impact of the 
fiscal crisis and the subsequent economic recession in the time period under 
consideration. German democracy has weathered the crisis well. 
Keywords: Support for democratic values, support for the German democratic 
regime, generalized support for political parties, impact of economic crises, 
partisan differences in support for democracy. 
Introduction 
In 2007/08 a crisis has hit the world’s financial system leading to the worst 
global economic recession the world has seen in the past 80 years (The Econ-
omist, September 7th 2013). The Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy of September 
2008 has become the symbolic hallmark of this event. As a consequence of this 
crisis the German economy suffered a contraction of the GDP by 6.8% one of 
the sharpest deteriorations since World War II. 
A sizeable body of literature deals with the impact of economic crises on po-
litical development. Historical accounts of the breakdown of democracy in the 
Weimar Republic and other European states (e.g. Bracher 1955; Berg-
Schlosser and Mitchell 2000, 2002) show that, in general, economic crises lead 
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to a deterioration of support for democracy. The more severe the impact of the 
economic crisis the greater the decline of the level of support for democracy. 
Other studies focusing on political attitudes and behavior suggest that this 
proposition must be modified by cultural conditions. In this respect ‘old’ estab-
lished democracies – such as Great Britain – are found less vulnerable to eco-
nomic crises than ‘younger’ democracies (Lipset 1959, 1966, 1994; Almond 
and Verba 1963). It is argued that citizens of established democracies have 
accumulated positive experiences with the flexibility of democratic institutions 
and the proper functioning of democratic politics when earlier economic crises 
had to be confronted. In post-war Germany the economic miracle of the 1950s 
is a case in point. The greater the number of such positive experiences with the 
functioning of one’s democratic regime the greater the probability that a gen-
eral democratic culture will take roots which softens the negative impact of 
economic crises and contributes to the persistence of democracy. 
Has there been a decline in support for democracy in the aftermath of the 
2007/08 fiscal crisis and the subsequent economic recession? This is the gen-
eral question we want to answer for the German case empirically. If we find 
that support for democracy has declined substantially, a classification of Ger-
many as a shock resistant established democracy must be questioned. Some 
political observers argue that German political culture still struggles to digest 
the legacies of Nazi- and former GDR’s communist ideology. Other assess-
ments come to the conclusion that Germany has had enough time to generate a 
solid level of diffuse political support  
a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or 
tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as 
damaging to their wants. Outputs and beneficial performance may rise and fall 
while this support, in the form of general attachment, continues (Easton 1975, 
444). 
If levels of support for democracy are high and if we find little or no change 
over time on the value level we would assume that German democracy has 
weathered the crisis well. The final conclusion must take into account, howev-
er, that our empirical evidence is limited to the time period stretching from mid 
2006 to early 2014. The situation might have changed thereafter. 
We answer our general question in four steps: 
1) We start with a differentiation of the concept of support for democracy. 
2) Second, we describe the data base and discuss our indicators for demo-
cratic support. 
3) Third, we present the empirical results in some detail and, 
4) in concluding we summarize our major finding: Support for democracy 
shows a pattern that is compatible with the cushioning potential of the 
political culture of an established democracy. 
We are aware of the vast number of research projects dealing with the topic of 
the impact of the 2007/08 economic crisis and support for democracy (e.g. 
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Polavieja 2012; Kroknes, Jacobsen and Gronning 2015; Cordero and Simon 
2016; Ferrin and Kriesi 2016; Penning 2017). These analyses mostly confirm 
the expectation of negative consequences on support for democracy. It is be-
yond the scope of our contribution to summarize and describe the results of 
these studies in this context. Rather we will focus on studying the four aspects 
outlined above. 
1.  Support for Democracy: A Conceptual Differentiation 
Support for democracy is a nuanced concept. It needs differentiation. In our 
analysis we rely on a conceptual framework proposed by Fuchs (1989, 2007) 
and Fuchs and Roller (2018). They distinguish three different objects of sup-
port: (1) support for democratic values, (2) support for the democratic regime 
of one’s own country and (3) generalized support for political actors. This 
differentiation owes to Easton (1975) and Parsons (1951). However, the typol-
ogies combine these older approaches in a hierarchical way which is particular-
ly helpful to understand variations in support for democracy that seem to be 
contradictory at first sight. For example, one can strongly support democratic 
values but have doubts about the institutional structure of one’s own democrat-
ic regime. In addition, their taxonomy leaves enough room for an interpretation 
of dynamic processes especially those caused by an overflow of values (from 
values to structures to actors) and a generalization of experiences (from actors 
to structure to values). This is particularly helpful when it comes to understand 
and explain patterns of change in support for democracy. 
Support for democratic values represents the highest level of the hierarchical 
model. It is also labeled ‘democratic culture’ narrowly defined as a commit-
ment to basic democratic values such as democracy, sovereignty of the people, 
liberty or political equality. It includes support for democracy as an ideal form 
of government which is essential for the persistence of any democratic system. 
The democratic regime of one’s own country represents the next level in the 
hierarchy. It consists of a specific institutional structure which in most cases is 
enshrined in a country’s constitution. Support for the democratic regime is 
linked to the regime’s persistence the same way as support for democratic 
values is linked to the persistence of the democratic system as the ideal form of 
government. 
Support for political actors or, in Easton’s terms, support for political au-
thorities, is located at the lowest level of the democratic systems hierarchy. At 
this level generalized support is most prominently expressed by allowing the 
re- or de-election of major political parties in competitive elections (see Table 
1). 
High levels of support for democratic values are a positive indication for 
democracy to persist. A similar assumption can also be made for support for 
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the democratic regime of one’s own country. The higher it is, the greater the 
probability of the regime’s persistence. A decline in regime support is often 
interpreted as a move towards an autocratic regime. However, as mentioned 
above, citizens may criticize their democratic regime because they feel that it 
does not live up fully to its own democratic norms and values or citizens may 
want to improve their democratic regime by changing selected institutions such 
as, for example, the electoral system. Thus, an evaluation of levels of support 
for the democratic regime in one’s own country should always consider the 
political context. The same is true for generalized support for political parties 
as the major actors of a representative democracy. For example, a very high 
support for a specific political party could be detrimental to the proper func-
tioning of the interplay between government and opposition (Blondel 1968).  
Table 1:  Different Levels of Support for Democracy and Consequences for the 
Persistence of Democracy 
Levels of the  
democratic system Attitudinal constructs Systemic consequences 
Democratic values  
(culture) Support for democratic values 
Persistence of the  
democratic system 
Democratic regime  
(structure) 
Support for the democratic  
regime of one’s own country 
Persistence of the  
democratic regime 
Actors 
Generalized support  
for political parties 
Re- or de-election of  
political parties 
Adapted from Fuchs (2007,166. A Model of System Culture). 
 
Overflow of values and generalization of experiences have an impact on sup-
port for the next lower or higher level of the democratic system. In most of the 
established democracies we would expect the highest stability at the value 
level. Citizens supporting democracy as an ideal form of government should 
not show a great deal of change just because of an economic crisis. Changes in 
support may be more visible at the regime level caused by concerns about the 
adequacy of particular institutions or by the generalization of positive or nega-
tive experiences with the processes at the actor level. It is a ‘normal’ character-
istic of competitive party systems of representative democracies that support 
levels for specific parties change. Under certain circumstances these changes 
can, however, affect support for democracy at the regime or even at the value 
levels. This is the case, for example, when citizens no longer hold the parties in 
government responsible for a negative economic or social development but 
blame it on their country’s democratic political regime. Lipset (1959) has em-
phasized the importance of this type of generalization when suggesting his 
effectiveness theorem. This theorem refers to the  
actual performance, the extent to which the system satisfies the basic func-
tions of government as most of the population and such powerful groups with-
in it as big business or the armed forces see them (Lipset 1966, 77, Roller 
2005, Thomassen and van der Kolk 2009).  
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2. The Data Base and Indicators of Democratic Support 
2.1  The Data Base 
In this analysis we focus on the long-term impact of an economic crisis on 
support for democracy by political elites and the electorate. We make use of a 
unique data base that provides both survey data for members of the German 
parliament and for the German populace. The latter surveys represent people of 
voting age living in Germany. To avoid a clumsy description and ensure better 
readability we will refer to ‘people of voting age living in Germany’ as ‘citi-
zens’ knowing well that some of the respondents in the WVS surveys may not 
hold a German passport. Their proportions are small and will not distort any 
general conclusions. Details of this data collection are presented in the Intro-
duction to Part II ‘The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Democracy’ (Klinge-
mann and Hoffmann-Lange 201x, in this issue).  
Identical questions regarding support for democracy in the detailed differen-
tiation proposed by Fuchs are available in the surveys allowing ‘elite-mass‘ 
comparisons within and across time. In our case the cross-time comparison 
capitalizes on the fact that the first round of surveys has been conducted before 
and the second one after the 2007/08 fiscal crisis and the subsequent economic 
recession (see Table 2). This offers the unique opportunity to empirically dis-
cuss the impact of this event on support for democracy by both members of 
parliament and ordinary citizens. Of course, the data at hand are not individual 
panel data. Thus, we are not in a position to measure change at the individual 
level caused by the economic crisis on attitudes and beliefs of citizens and 
members of parliament. However, we can present data aggregated to the level 
of party groupings before and after the crisis and engage in a discussion of 
whether support levels and change patterns point in the direction of a growing, 
stable or declining support for democracy.  
Table 2: The Data Base: Surveys Included in the Analysis 
 
Surveys of Members of  
Parliament 
MP1 / MP2 
Surveys of citizens 
(18 years and older) 
WVS1 / WVS2 
T1 Begin of fieldwork 23.02.2007 02.05.2006 
T1 End of fieldwork 08.08.2007 21.06.2006 
T2 Begin of fieldwork 14.02.2013 22.07.2013 
T2 End of fieldwork 14.02.2014 13.11.2013 
 
In the concluding remarks we speculate about the impact of government action 
and policies on crisis perception and support of democracy. This section mostly 
relies on trend data (monthly surveys) provided by the Forschungsgruppe Wah-
len (FGW) which are aggregated for the first and the second half of each year 
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starting in 2005 and ending in 2014. These data capture the variation of public 
opinion in the period between the two surveys of the members of parliament 
(MP T1, MP T2) and the two surveys of the German populace (WVS T1, WVS 
T2) for selected attitudes and beliefs important for our argument. They cover 
the citizens’ perception of the general economic situation, satisfaction with 
democratic performance, and support of political parties. Finally, we use ag-
gregate data compiled by DuPlessis and Freytag (2012) to locate the beginning 
(peak) and the end of the first phase of the economic recession (trough). 
2.2  Indicators of Support for Democracy 
We are not in a position to come up with a broad set of valid and reliable indi-
cators for the three levels of support for democracy as suggested by Fuchs’ 
taxonomy within the constraints of our data-base. In the citizen-surveys (WVS 
T1, WVS T2) and the surveys of the members of parliament (MP T1, MP T2) 
there are just seven questions measuring support for democracy. In addition, if 
we want to use the same indicators to compare citizens and members of par-
liament over time the number of questions is again drastically reduced. All 
questions available are documented in Table 3. Those highlighted we use as 
indicators to represent the three different levels of support for democracy: 
Support for democratic values, support for the German democratic regime, and 
generalized support for political parties. Each concept is represented by one 
indicator only. Of course, we would have preferred multiple items for each of 
the concepts. However, we are restricted by what is available in the four sur-
veys. We claim that the three indicators at hand measure what they are sup-
posed to measure and we hope that additional indicators would have generated 
consistent results. Moreover, all three items have already been part of well-
developed multi-item indices for similar concepts in other studies (e.g. Hoff-
mann-Lange 2015; Berg-Schlosser and Hoffmann-Lange 2018 [2019?]).  
To value democracy as the ideal form of government is most the fundamen-
tal aspect of support for democracy. In the surveys available three attempts 
have been made to measure this concept. The first inquires about the im-
portance to live in a country that is governed democratically. The second takes 
up Churchill’s statement that despite of all its shortcomings democracy is still 
better than any other political system as a way of governing a country. The 
third question asks respondents to compare a democratic system with forms of 
non-democratic government. For our analysis we use the last indicator because 
the relevant question has been asked in all four surveys. Conceptually the indi-
cator is expected to cover a commitment to democratic values. We have 
checked our indicator’s association with three specific democratic values: free 
elections (people choose their leaders in free elections), civil rights (civil rights 
protect people’s liberty against oppression) and women’s rights (women have 
the same rights as men). For the citizen surveys all correlation coefficients are 
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positive and significant at the .000 level. The MPs at both points in time agreed 
almost unanimously with the four items in the direction of democratic values. 
Given the extreme skewness of the relevant distributions it does not make sense 
to calculate correlation coefficients. We have looked, instead, at the proportion 
of MPs choosing the highest possible positive category of both indicators. The 
results are as follows: 
1) Having a democratic system is ‘very good’ and free elections are ‘essen-
tial’: T1 92%, T2 89%.  
2) Having a democratic system is ‘very good’ and civil rights are ‘essen-
tial’: T1 88%, T2 80%. 
3) Having a democratic system is ‘very good’ and women’s rights are ‘es-
sential’: T1 97%, T2 89%. 
These findings support the validity of the indicator and the assumption that we 
can interpret ‘support for democracy as an ideal form of government’ as cover-
ing a commitment to a broader set of democratic values. We want to add that 
citizens inevitably associate different meanings and expectations with the term 
‘democracy’ (Fuchs and Klingemann 2002, 25; Coppedge and Gerring 2011; 
Lindberg et al. 2014). This should not be concealed by labeling the indicator as 
we do. 
Democratic values are differently institutionalized in different countries. 
There is a difference between support for democratic values and support for a 
specific democratic regime that has institutionalized a particular set of demo-
cratic principles. Citizens may support their country’s democratic regime be-
cause they support this set of democratic values. However, they can also be 
dissatisfied with their democratic regime because they feel that it is not demo-
cratic enough and in need of change (Norris 1999; Klingemann 1999, 2014). 
Two indicators are available to measure support for the democratic regime. The 
first question asks about the satisfaction with the way democracy is developing 
in one’s country (‘our country’). The second question solicits an evaluation of 
how democratically “this (our) country” is being governed today. This empha-
sizes the aspect of ‘democratic performance’ rather than ‘systemic perfor-
mance’ (Fuchs 1998, 152; Roller 2005, 22). We rely on the second indicator 
because – as was the case with support for democratic values – it is the only 
one available in all four surveys.  
Political parties are the key political actors of representative democracy. In 
the analysis we rely on an indicator measuring confidence in political parties 
which is conceptualized as generalized support for political parties. The rele-
vant question has also been asked in all four surveys. The exact wording of the 
questions used for analysis is provided in Table 3. 
Response categories are different for the various questions. In order to ease 
comparability and interpretation we have rescaled the scores to have a mini-
mum of 0 and a maximum of 1.0. 0 is the expression of the lowest possible 
support for democracy. 1 is the expression of the highest possible support for 
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democracy. Accordingly, fractions of 1 denote different degrees of support for 
democracy with meaningful endpoints and thresholds: 0 indicates that support 
of democracy is completely absent, 0.25 and 0.33 that it is mostly but not com-
pletely absent, 0.50 that it is halfway present, 0.66 and 0.75 that it is mostly but 
not completely present, and 1 that it is completely present (Welzel 2013, 64). 
Table 3: Indicators of Support for Democracy and their Measurement 
Type of support Question wording 
Democratic values (culture) 
Importance of democracy 
 
WVS T1, T2 
How important is it for you to live in a country that is 
governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is 
‘not at all important’ and 10 means ‘absolutely important’ 
what position would you choose? 
Democracy is better than any 
other political system 
 
MP T1, T2 
I am going to read a statement that people sometimes say 
about a democratic political system. Could you please tell 
me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly 
disagree. 
Although democracy has many shortcomings, it is still 
better than any other political system. 
Support for democracy as an 
ideal form of government 
 
WVS T1, T2 
MP T1, T2 
I am going to describe various types of political systems and 
ask what you think about each as a way of governing this 
country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly 
good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?  
Having a democratic system 
1 very good, 2  fairly good, 3  fairly bad, 4  very bad 
Democratic Regime (structure) 
Satisfaction with the way  
democracy is developing in our 
country 
 
MP T1, T2 
On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not 
very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy 
is developing in our country? 
1 very satisfied, 2 rather satisfied, 3 not very satisfied, 4 not 
at all satisfied 
Support for the German  
democratic regime 
 
WVS T1, T2 
MP T1, T2 
And how democratically is this country being governed 
today? 
Using a scale where 1 means it is ‘not at all democratic’ 
and 10 means ‘completely democratic’ what position 
would you choose? 
Democratic Actors (political authorities) 
Generalized support for political 
parties 
 
WVS T1, T2 
MP T1, T2 
I am going to name a number of organizations. For each 
one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in 
them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confi-
dence, not much confidence or none at all? 
‘Political parties’ 
Bold face: Indicator used in the analysis. 
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3.  Design of the Empirical Analysis 
In this analysis we describe levels of support for democracy of ordinary Ger-
man citizens as well as members of the German parliament before and after the 
fiscal crisis and the subsequent economic recession. More specifically, we 
compare relevant political attitudes and beliefs of citizens and political elites at 
two points in time as well as across time.  
Average levels of support will be reported both for results obtained by the 
citizen and the MP surveys. Average levels of support for democracy will also 
be presented for groups of party supporters (vote intention) and for parties in 
parliament. This opens the possibility to relate citizens and political elites at 
each of the two time-points as well as across time at the party level. 
Why choose parties as the level of comparison? Political parties are particu-
larly suited for such a comparison because they function as the major link 
between citizens and their representatives. Thus, partisanship is a theoretically 
meaningful concept to relate political attitudes and beliefs of citizens and their 
representatives in parliament. Political parties are arguably the most important 
actors in representative democracy. They are expected to be responsive to the 
demands of citizens and to propose policies to deal with the major issues on the 
political agenda. As a rule, political parties present their goals and policy posi-
tions to the electorate by issuing programs for which they seek support in com-
petitive elections. If in government, political parties are assumed to live up to 
their promises (Fuchs 1993; Mueller 2000; Dalton et al. 2011). 
It is widely believed that political parties have lost much of their importance 
in the current political process. Turnout in elections has been on the decline in 
many countries and confidence in political parties seems to be low. However, 
in spite of all these observations the political party remains the most important 
actor in representative democracy. Parties compete for votes in elections to 
gain legitimate political power. They are still the key intermediaries between 
citizens and the state. Mueller (2000) argues that political parties exist because 
they reduce transaction costs in the electoral, parliamentary and governmental 
arenas and help to overcome the dilemma of collective action. Fuchs (1993) 
has proposed a process model of representative democracy that accords politi-
cal parties a prominent status. In this model political parties turn citizen de-
mands into political issues, “bundle” demands into political programs which 
subsequently guide the decisions of their representatives in parliament and 
government.  
These are the reasons why party support has been selected as the common 
denominator to relate members of parliament and citizens. The concept is de-
fined broadly and meant to cover party membership as well as all other modes 
of partisanship such as party identification, party leaning, vote intention or 
voting behavior. Party attachment is easy to identify for members of parlia-
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ment. As far as citizens are concerned party support is measured by the follow-
ing question: 
 “If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list 
would you vote?” 
In the pre-crisis survey (WVS T1) the interviewer was advised to say: Just 
call out the number on this card. If you are uncertain, which party appeals to 
you most? 
If respondents said ‘don’t know’ in the post-crisis survey (WVS T2) inter-
viewers were advised to follow-up with: Which party appeals to you most?  
The political parties listed in Table 4 have been represented in the German 
national parliament during the time period under consideration. They command 
enough support in the populace that standard survey samples generate a suffi-
ciently large number of interviews to allow statistical analysis. This is not the 
case for partisans of very small political parties. These respondents are repre-
sented in our analysis as supporters of ‘other’ political parties. However, there 
still is the large group of citizens who do not support any political party. All 
respondents who did not mention a political party when asked which party they 
would vote for in a national election jointly form the group of ‘no party sup-
porters’. This group also includes respondents who refused or did not answer 
the question for some reason. 
Table 4:  Number of Party Supporters in the World Values Surveys (WVS) and 
of the Parties Represented in the Bundestag in the MP Surveys 
Party support WVS T1 MP T1 WVS T2 MP T2 
Party of Democratic Socialism / The Left 94 (188)* 9 (11) 117 (202) 12 (16) 
Alliance 90 / The Greens 166 (127) 8 (10) 168 (154) 14 (15) 
Social Democratic Party 477 (456) 37 (31) 478 (419) 26 (29) 
Free Democratic Party 86 (87) 10 (13) 49 (44) 17 (17) 
Christian Democratic Union /  
Christian Social Union 
550 (509) 37 (36) 601 (652) 43 (35) 
National Democratic Party 29 (36)  16 (20)  
Alternative for Germany   33 (34)  
Supporters of ‘other’ political parties 14 (21)  26 (25)  
No party support 647 (640)  553 (494)  
Total 2064 101 2041 112 
*Unweight Number of Cases in brackets. 
 
The official name of the German leftmost party has changed in June 2007 when 
the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), successor party to the east German 
communist Socialist Unity Party (SED), joined forces with the West German 
‘Work & Social Justice – The Election Alternative (Arbeit & soziale Gerecht-
igkeit – Die Wahlalternative, WASG)’ to found the party currently labeled 
‘The Left’. This name change took place after the first MP survey (23.02.2007) 
and the first citizen survey (02.05.2006) went to the field. While the name ‘The 
Left’ is well established by now, we decided to label the party ‘PDS/The Left’. 
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Table 4 documents the number of interviews available for analysis both for the 
World Values Surveys and the surveys of the members of parliament. 
As far as the surveys of the members of parliament are concerned the num-
ber of respondents is rather small for some parties in parliament. Thus, survey 
estimates have rather high error terms. We use these small numbers of cases 
anyway to aggregate attitudes and beliefs at the party level. In this case we 
conceptualize groups of respondents not as part of a probability sample but as 
the best experts we can get to generate data about support for democracy of the 
various parties in parliament.  
The analysis pays particular attention to the time period stretching from Sep-
tember 2002 to September 2013. As far as the parties and their governments are 
concerned this period has seen the same five parties in the four national parlia-
ments elected in 2002, 2005, 2009 and 2013. We count the Christian Demo-
crats and the Christian Socials of Bavaria as one party grouping which can be 
justified because these two so-called ‘sister’ parties act as one party in the 
national parliament. Three different coalition governments were formed after 
these four elections. A “red-green” SPD - Alliance’90/The Greens coalition 
with Gerhard Schroeder as the chancellor held power from 2002 to 2005, fol-
lowed by a CDU/CSU-SPD Grand Coalition (2005 to 2009), a “Christian–
Liberal” coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP (2009 to 2013), which in turn was 
followed by another CDU/CSU-SPD Grand Coalition governing from 2013 to 
2017. The three latter coalitions saw Angela Merkel as the chancellor at the 
helm. This means between 2002 and 2013 Germany has experienced three 
different coalition governments. Thus, all parties represented in the national 
parliament – with the exception of PDS/The Left – have held government posi-
tions. The first Grand Coalition suffered the brunt of the fiscal and economic 
crisis but it also had the opportunity to try its policies to successfully tackle the 
challenges of the crisis. In 2013 the survey revealed that members of parlia-
ment were under the impression that the CDU/CSU in particular but also the 
SPD as the coalition partner, had benefited and not suffered from the crisis. On 
a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 means that a party has suffered and 10 means that a 
party has profited, on average the CDU/CSU reached a score of 7.6 and the 
SPD scored 5.0 while the PDS/The Left and the A’90/The Greens (both 4.7) 
and the FDP (4.6) trailed behind.  
While focusing on the party level we want to emphasize that citizens who do 
not support a political party represent a sizeable part of the electorate we must 
not ignore. Considering the four elections mentioned above the average propor-
tion of non-voters amounts to 23 percent of those entitled to vote. 
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Table 5:  Votes and Seats of Governing and Opposition Parties in the National 
Parliamentary Elections 
 SPD A’90-Greens CDU/CSU FDP PDS / The Left 
2002      
Votes* 38.5 8.6 38.5 7.4 4.0 
Seats 41.6 9.1 41.1 7.8 0.3 
 Gov’t Gov’t Opposition Opposition Opposition 
2005      
Votes* 34.2 8.1 35.2 9.8 8.7 
Seats 36.2 8.3 36.8 9.9 8.8 
 Gov’t Opposition Gov’t Opposition Opposition 
2009      
Votes* 23.0 10.7 33.8 14.6 11.9 
Seats 23.5 10.9 38.4 15.0 12.2 
 Opposition Opposition Gov’t Gov’t Opposition 
2013      
Votes* 25.7 8.4 41.5 4.8 8.6 
Seats 30.6 10.0 49.3 0 10.1 
 Gov’t Opposition Gov’t Opposition Opposition 
*second votes. 
4. The Time-Line of the Analysis 
For the analysis it is important to know when exactly the fiscal crisis hit the 
German economy and when, thereafter, the German economy started to recov-
er. This information will help us to gauge the crisis’ visibility for the respond-
ents of the two post-crisis surveys. DuPlessis and Freytag (2012) have made a 
systematic attempt to determine the exact dates of the beginning of the crisis 
and the first turning point based on economic cycle theory. In line with classi-
cal conceptualizations they define cycles as successive periods of relative ex-
pansion and decline in aggregate economic activity. The turning points - called 
troughs and peaks - separate periods of relative increase and relative decline in 
aggregate economic growth. The algorithm used by DuPlessis and Freytag to 
determine these dates was developed by Bry and Boschan (1971). It identifies 
local minima (troughs) and local maxima (peaks) in a single time series. The 
time series used to calculate the beginning of the recession consists of inflation 
adjusted quarterly GDP data starting with the first quarter of 1990 and ending 
with the first quarter of 2012. Relying on this methodology the recession in 
Germany began in the first quarter of 2008 (peak); the recovery (trough) started 
in the second quarter of 2009 (see Table 6).   
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Table 6: Time Distance between the Beginning of the Crisis and the Beginning 
of the Fieldwork of the Post-Crisis Surveys 
Post-crisis 
surveys 
Begin of crisis 
(peak)* 
Begin of  
fieldwork 
Number 
of days 
T2 WVS 01.02.2008 22.07.2013 1998 
T2 MP 01.02.2008 14.02.2013 1385 
 
Having determined the beginning of the crisis we can place the periods of 
fieldwork for our surveys in their historical context. By definition the pre-crisis 
surveys were in the field before the crisis started. As shown in Table 6, the 
respondents of the post-crisis surveys answered our questions more than five 
years after the crisis started. This means that – if asked about the crisis – they 
evaluated an event that had happened in the past. Details may no longer be 
readily present. On the other hand, respondents had ample opportunity to think 
about it and to observe how political actors, parties and their governments in 
particular, have responded to and handled the economic crisis and its socioeco-
nomic consequences. The post-crisis survey of members of parliament asked 
the following question:  
Please evaluate the impact of the global financial and economic crisis on 
Germany, using a scale from 1 to 10. ‘1’ means that it has no negative impact 
at all and ‘10’ means that the crisis has had a severe negative impact. 
Results show a differentiated picture. In the eyes of the MPs the impact of the 
crisis on the country in general was rated 5.3 on average. A higher impact was 
assumed for the country’s banking system (6.0) followed by the country’s 
economy in general (5.2). That the crisis had a negative impact on the people’s 
standard of living (4.6) and the quality of democracy in Germany was believed 
to a lesser degree (4.2). 
Figure 1: The Structure of the Time Line of the Analysis 
 
Figure 1 presents the time line of our analyses. It shows the date for the begin-
ning of the crisis, the time frames for the generation of the survey data as well 
as the dates for the parliamentary elections and the resulting national govern-
ments. 
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5.  Expectations 
We propose four hypotheses. The first three are in line with what is argued in 
most of the literature mentioned above. 
(H1) First we expect that the fiscal crisis and the subsequent economic re-
cession has had a negative impact on support for democracy.  
(H2) The second expectation emphasizes the importance of a democratic po-
litical culture. The more established a democratic political regime, the 
greater the probability that the impact of the fiscal crisis and the eco-
nomic recession will be cushioned and leave support for democracy 
relatively unharmed. 
(H3) Third we assume that members of parliament should display higher 
levels of support for democracy than citizens of the general populace. 
Democratic values are deeply engrained. They are obtained by political sociali-
zation dating back to early childhood (Easton and Dennis 1969), living in a 
democratic country and the experience of its problem-solving capacity. Citi-
zens who were brought up in families adhering to democratic values and have 
lived in an established democracy are expected to have developed a commit-
ment to democratic values that does not suddenly change when the economy is 
hit by a fiscal and economic crisis (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). 
If supported by our empirical results this would speak for the validity of the 
political culture thesis. 
In ‘normal times’ this argument should also hold for support for the demo-
cratic regime because democratic values are needed to legitimize the structure 
of a democratic regime. However, ‘normal times’ also assume an ‘acceptable’ 
performance of the political actors (Roller 2005). If – as has been argued by 
Lipset in particular – performance of political authorities continuously fails to 
meet public expectations levels of support for the democratic regime can be 
affected. Under these circumstances negative experiences with the policy per-
formance of the major political actors are likely to be generalized and may 
reach the regime level. 
In the analysis we compare ordinary citizens and members of parliament. 
We assume that support for democracy should generally be higher for members 
of parliament than for the populace because all MPs belong to democratic 
political parties and have reached their political power positions as party mem-
bers in the institutional context of a representative democracy. 
The fourth hypothesis tests a particular pattern of support for an established 
democracy. As suggested by the conceptual distinctions between the different 
objects of support, we expect to find different levels of support for democratic 
values, the German democratic regime, and for the political parties as the major 
political actors. Fuchs’ taxonomy posits a hierarchy of these three objects 
which implies differing degrees of importance for the democratic system. Thus, 
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support for democratic values should be higher than support for the specific 
German democratic regime or this regime’s key political authorities. Changes 
over time should be lowest at the value level and highest at the actor level. This 
pattern-hypothesis is the fourth and last expectation we want to test. 
(H4) The typical support pattern of an established democracy should show a 
ranking. The highest levels of support should be for the value level 
(culture) level and the lowest for the actor level (process) with the re-
gime level (structure) in between. It should also show that if there is 
change over time the degree of change should be lowest at the value 
level and highest at the actor level. 
6.  Empirical Analysis 
We present the empirical analysis in two major sections. First, we describe 
levels of support for democracy and degrees of ‘change’ for citizens and politi-
cal elites (H1, H2). Averages of support levels and their respective changes will 
be presented for each of the three indicators in general as well as for party 
supporters and parties in parliament. In that context we also consider the expec-
tation that levels of support for democracy should be higher for members of 
parliament than for ordinary citizens (H3). Second, we discuss (H4) the par-
ticular pattern of levels and degree of change of support for democracy. 
As was already mentioned we have rescaled scores of the variables to a min-
imum of 0 and a maximum of 1. Responses are measured at an ordinal level. 
Thus, it is assured that an original score of 4 is higher than a score of 1, or a 
score of 1 is lower than a score of 4. We don’t know, however, whether or not 
the distances between the scale values are meaningful (equal) as would be the 
case for an interval level of measurement. Despite this shortcoming our anal-
yses mostly rely on calculating means to describe support levels. Means relia-
bly indicate the central tendency of a distribution. Averages or means capture a 
major essential of a distribution. They are easy to understand and to communi-
cate. However, we have to assume that the respondents perceive equal distanc-
es between the scores. 
6.1  Support for Democratic Values 
To measure support for democratic values respondents were asked to indicate 
their preference for a democratic system as a good way of governing a country 
in comparison to non-democratic systems of government. 
Table 7.1 shows a very high level of support for democracy as an ideal form 
of government both for the populace and for the members of parliament at both 
periods of time. 95 percent of citizens and all MPs prefer having a democratic 
system (‘having a democratic system’ is good or very good) at T1 and T2. On 
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average we find support levels higher by 14 (T1) and 13 (T2) points for mem-
bers of parliament. Results demonstrate that support for democracy as an ideal 
form of government is (1) very high and (2) stable over time. This finding does 
not support the assumption of a negative effect of the fiscal crisis and the sub-
sequent economic recession on support for democracy. H1 is not confirmed. 
Rather, the finding speaks for the cushioning effect of an established (‘old’) 
democratic culture as assumed by H2. 
Table 7.1: Support for Democratic Values  
Having a democratic system WVS T1  
Citizens 
WVS T2  
Citizens 
MPs T1 MPs T2 
0.00 very bad 1.1 1.7 – – 
.33 3.6 3.1 – – 
.67 34.0 29.7 2.3 1.7 
1.00 very good 61.3 65.5 97.7 98.3 
Mean .852 .864 .993 .994 
Std. dev. .206 .212 .050 .043 
Missing 3.2 1.3 3.1 - 
Total N 2064 2041 101 112 
See question text in Table 3 (0 very bad to 1 very good way of governing). 
 
Do groups of party supporters show different patterns? Taking into account the 
generally high level of support for democracy as an ideal form of government 
we cannot expect to find large differences. This expectation is confirmed by 
Table 7.2 and it is particularly true for the parties in parliament. Between 
groups of party supporters the picture is one of high support levels and little 
change over time, too. There is a somewhat lower level of support by the small 
group of supporters of the right-wing National Democratic Party (NPD). How-
ever, even the supporters of this party – as well as the newly emerging right-
wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) – show average support levels above .70. 
‘Other’ partisans and citizens with no party affiliation (no party supported) also 
support democracy as an ideal form of government very strongly. In any case 
we do not find a sharp decline or increase of support levels. Thus, both for 
party groups of citizens and for parties in parliament there are no indications 
that democracy is under threat at the value level. 
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Table 7.2: Support for Democratic Values by Party Support 
Party support WVS T1 
Citizens 
WVS T2 
Citizens 
MPs T1 MPs T2 
PDS/The Left .84 (.227)* .82 (.216) 1.00 (.000) 1.00 (.000) 
AL’90/The Greens .89 (.184) .88 (.225) 1.00 (.000) .98 (.086) 
SPD .86 (.221) .84 (.246) .99 (.060) 1.00 (.000) 
FDP .84 (.232) .90 (.159) 1.00 (.000) .98 (.081) 
CDU / CSU .86 (.192) .89 (.187)  .99 (.058) 1.00 (.000) 
NDP .74 (.311) .71 (.286) – – 
AfD – .82 (.233) – – 
Supporters of 
other political 
parties .83 (.230) .93 (.136) – – 
No party  
supported 
 
.84 
 
(.196) 
 
.86 
 
(.197) 
 
– 
 
– 
Missing values % 3.2 1.3 3.1 – 
Total 2064 2041 101 112 
*in brackets: Standard deviation. 
6.2  Support for Germany's Democratic Regime 
Support for the German democratic regime was measured by asking how dem-
ocratically the country is being governed today. Respondents could express 
their opinion using a ten-point scale ranging from ‘not at all democratic’ to 
‘completely democratic’.  
Table 7.3: Support for the German Democratic Regime 
How democratically is the  
country governed? 
WVS T1  
Citizens 
WVS T2  
Citizens 
MPs T1 MPs T2 
0.00 not at all democratic 1.8 0.5 – – 
0.11 1.9 1.0 – 0.8 
0.22 3.2 2.9 – 1.6 
0.33 4.7 4.1 1.6 1.8 
0.44 9.5 9.6 0.8 3.9 
0.56 11.9 10.3 1.6 6.5 
0.67 21.3 20.6 16.1 6.6 
0.78 25.6 28.5 25.2 39.1 
0.89 13.9 12.6 33.0 27.5 
1.00 completely democratic 6.2 9.9 21.7 12.3 
Mean .661 .691 .832 .779 
Std. dev. .220 .201 .137 .174 
Missing 1.7 1.7 1.0 0.8 
Total N 2064 2041 101 112 
See question text in Table 3. 
 
Results presented in Table 7.3 show that average support levels of citizens for 
the German democratic regime reach .66 at T1 and .69 at T2. As expected 
score values are again higher for MPs. On average they are in the range of .83 
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at T1 and .78 at T2. Change over time signals an increase of support in the 
populace and a small decline at the level of the MPs. This means that more than 
two-thirds of both citizens and MPs think that Germany is governed democrati-
cally. While there is on average a 5 point decrease among members of parlia-
ment we observe a 3 point increase at the citizen level. These results are also 
not in support of H1. They do not reflect a dramatic impact of the fiscal crisis 
and the economic recession on support for the German democratic regime. 
Findings are in line with those reported for support for democratic values and 
strengthen a political culture interpretation.  
What is the picture when considering party groupings? Table 7.4 presents 
the results. Not surprisingly a large majority of MPs of all parliamentary parties 
are of the opinion that Germany is democratically governed – with MPs of the 
PDS/The Left showing the lowest mean values of .59 (T1) and .52 (T2) respec-
tively. As far as citizens are concerned, the lowest support levels at T1 are 
measured for the small group of ‘other’ parties (.41), for supporters of the 
PDS/The Left (.48) and for the right-wing NPD (.51). This picture is mirrored 
at T2 for the NPD (.53), the newly emerging AfD (.59) and the ‘other’ parties 
(.57). Contrary to the development of their parliamentary party we observe a 
large increase in support for the German democratic regime (14 points) for the 
PDS/The Left at the citizen level. 
Table 7.4: Support for the German Democratic Regime by Party Support 
Party support WVS T1 
Citizens 
WVS T2 
Citizens 
MPs T1 MPs T2 
PDS/The Left .48 (.229)* .62 (.203) .59 (.160) .52 (.134) 
AL’90/The Greens .66 (.230) .71 (.212) .83 (.079) .75 (.125) 
SPD .69 (.198) .68 (.226) .85 (.130) .78 (.143) 
FDP .63 (.219) .71 (.165) .82 (.098) .84 (.176) 
CDU / CSU .70 (.189) .75 (.184) .88 (.095) .84 (.146) 
NDP .51 (.273) .53 (.310) – – 
AfD – .59 (.192) – – 
Supporters of 
other political 
parties .41 (.297) .57 (.247) 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
No party 
 supported 
 
.65 
 
(.230) 
 
.66 
 
(.182) 
 
– 
 
– 
Missing values % 1.7 1.7 1.0 0.8 
Total 2064 2041 101 112 
*In brackets: Standard deviation.  
See question text in Table 3 (0 not at all democratic to 1 completely democratic). 
 
Change patterns at the level of party supporters signal a substantial increase in 
the belief that Germany is governed democratically. Supporters of the SPD are 
the only group that does not share this trend but shows stability (T1 .69; T2 
.68). That the SPD has been in opposition at the time of the second survey 
(WVS T2) could be a possible explanation. Parties in parliament display an 
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opposite pattern. Support levels decline between 4 and 8 points with the FDP as 
an exception. This party gained 2 points. Their participating in government in 
that period of time may again be in line with the government vs. opposition 
explanation we have attempted above. The opposite development of support for 
the German democratic regime of citizens and the MPs deserves further atten-
tion. We suspect that the MPs lower evaluations in 2013 may have been influ-
enced by the electoral campaign, the election and the fact that the formation of 
a new government took much longer than usual. In any case we have observed 
change between the two points in time which is not congruent between citizens 
and their representatives. However, these changes are not dramatic for any of 
the relevant political parties. They would not justify a modification of our 
conclusions regarding the first two hypotheses. 
6.3  Generalized Support for Political Parties 
Support for political parties is measured by the confidence placed in political 
parties in general. This generalization is an important qualification. In Germany 
we normally find a relatively high willingness to support a particular political 
party. However, people are much more reluctant once it comes to trust political 
parties in general. It has been suggested that citizens in countries which have 
experienced a totalitarian party state are particularly hesitant to have general-
ized confidence in political parties. This is an issue that needs further investiga-
tion. Generalized trust in political parties is important because it ensures the 
interplay of government and opposition. Voters who are dissatisfied with the 
party they had voted for most of the time must have enough confidence in any 
of the other parties to be able to vote for an alternative. 
We argue that political parties and their governments are among the most 
important actors of a representative democracy (Castles and Wildenmann 1986; 
Gabriel, Niedermayer and Stoess 1997; Dalton, Farrell and McAllister 2011; 
McAllister 2018). As a rule, political parties present their goals and policy 
positions to the electorate by issuing programs for which they seek support in 
competitive elections. If in government, political parties are assumed to live up 
to their promises and solve problems in their role as government or opposition. 
The more they contribute to problem solving the more they generate ac-
ceptance and support. If they don’t the opposite is the case. 
The average level of confidence of members of parliament in political par-
ties is lower than support for democratic values or support for the German 
democratic regime (Table 7.5). MPs show mean values of .54 at T1 and .60 at 
T2. Citizen support reaches mean values of .29 at T1 and .37 at T2. Results 
signal an upward move of 6 and 8 points respectively. These results are, again, 
not in line with the expectation of a negative impact on support for democracy 
because of the fiscal crisis and the economic recession as expressed in H1. 
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Generalized support for political parties increases over time and does not de-
crease. 
Table 7.5: Generalized Support for Political Parties 
Confidence in political parties WVS T1  
Citizens 
WVS T2  
Citizens 
MPs T1 MPs T2 
0.00 no confidence at all 30.7 16.2 – 1.2 
0.33 53.2 59.3 39.5 24.2 
0.67 15.4 21.8 59.4 69.6 
1.00 a great deal of confidence 0.7 2.7 1.1 5.0 
Mean .287 .370 .539 .595 
Std. dev. .228 .230 .170 .181 
Missing 4.1 2.5 6.9 5.9 
Total N 2064 2041 101 112 
See question text in Table 3 (0 no confidence at all to 1 a great deal of confidence). 
 
In representative democracy levels of support for political parties and their 
governments are likely to be reflected in party election results and subsequent 
government formation. Supporters of parties that are doing well in the elections 
and are in a position to participate in government are expected to display higher 
levels of generalized support than those who are doing less well. We will check 
this assumption by comparing groups of party supporters.  
Before we start we will shortly sketch out the fortunes of the political parties 
in the periods of time when our surveys were fielded. The pre-crisis citizen 
survey (WVS T1) was in the field from May to June 2006. Members of parlia-
ment were surveyed for the first time from February to August 2007 (MP T1). 
Thus, both citizens and MPs were interviewed in the days of a stable 
CDU/CSU-SPD Grand Coalition with Angela Merkel as the chancellor (Mer-
kel I, 22.11.2005 - 27.10.2009). The political context of the second round of 
surveys is more complex. The post-crisis citizen survey started in July and 
ended in November 2013 (WVS T2). When half of the interview period was 
over voters had to go to the polls (22 September 2013). This means that a size-
able number of respondents did not know the election result and its conse-
quences for government formation. The MP interviews started in February 
2013 and ended a full year later in February 2014 (MP T2). There are many 
reasons for this unusually long period of fieldwork which we do not want to 
discuss in detail. It is sufficient to say that many MPs were simply not in a 
position to grant an interview during the hot phase of the election campaign or 
during the process of government formation. Taking into account the context of 
the fieldwork we have to consider that respondents experienced (a) the election 
campaign leading up to the 22 September 2013 federal election, (b) the subse-
quent breakdown of the Christian-Liberal coalition and (c) the talks and negoti-
ations culminating in the 17 December 2013 formation of the Merkel III gov-
ernment. However, we should add that the CDU/CSU served as the leading 
party from September 2005 to September 2013 with Angela Merkel as the 
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chancellor – an anchor of stability. The SPD, in turn, was needed as a junior 
coalition partner to form the federal government in September 2005 and 2013 
with Franz Müntefering and Frank Walter Steinmeier as vice-chancellors. The 
FDP became the junior partner of a CDU/CSU coalition government in Sep-
tember 2009 with Guido Westerwelle as the vice-chancellor. 
Election results differ a lot for the parties in government. While the SPD 
suffered a dramatic loss of votes from 2005 to 2009 of more than 11 percent 
points (34.2% – 23.0%), the CDU/CSU’s share declined only slightly (35.2% - 
33.8%) with the FDP celebrating its best result ever in any federal election after 
1949. Four years later, however, the Liberals were unable to overcome the five-
percent-hurdle and disappeared from the federal parliament that was newly 
elected in September 2013. In that election the Christian Democrats gained 7.7 
percent points while the Social Democrats could improve their vote share by 
2.7 percent points. 
We expect that these developments had an impact on the generalized confi-
dence in political parties. After all at least three parties could gain government 
positions (counting CDU/CSU as one). In this situation MPs and citizen sup-
porters of these parties should display the highest degrees of generalized sup-
port in political parties. This should be particularly true for the CDU/CSU. Not 
only did the CDU/CSU best in all national elections under consideration. It was 
also the undisputed leading force in forming the three coalition governments 
with Angela Merkel as chancellor. The Liberals had been the preferred coali-
tion partner in the 2009-2013 Merkel II government. When the FDP failed to 
enter the federal parliament in September 2013, the CDU/CSU had to look out 
for another partner. The SPD had governed with the Merkel I Grand Coalition 
from 22 November 2005 to 27 October 2009 and could expect to be asked to 
enter another Grand Coalition in 2013. Thus, if the parties’ recent participation 
in government plays a role for generalized support of political authorities we 
would expect high levels for CDU/CSU, the FDP and the SPD (that had gov-
erned with the CDU/CSU from 2005 to 2009). 
As far as the populace is concerned Table 7.6 shows the highest confidence 
levels at T1 for CDU/CSU (.33) and SPD (.32). At T2 the CDU/CSU and FDP 
are in the lead (both .41) narrowly followed by the SPD (.40). Parties in par-
liament mirror this pattern. At T1 the MP’s of the CDU/CSU and the SPD 
show the highest confidence level of .58 each. At T2 this was the case for the 
MP’s of the SPD (.63), CDU/CSU (.61) and the FDP (.60). This pattern is in 
line with the expectation that MPs that have entered parliament as candidates of 
political parties also believe that parties are the key actors in a representative 
democracy. 
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Table 7.6: Generalized Support for Political Parties by Party Support 
Party support WVS T1 
Citizens 
WVS T2 
Citizens 
MPs T1 MPs T2 
PDS/The Left .22 (.219)* .33 (.220) .36 (.102) .47 (.171) 
AL’90/The Greens .29 (.224) .32 (.209) .46 (.175) .59 (.147) 
SPD .32 (.227) .40 (.232) .58 (.150) .63 (.169) 
FDP .30 (.240) .41 (.244) .46 (.171) .60 (.181) 
CDU / CSU .33 (.218) .41 (.221) .58 (.169) .61 (.191) 
NDP .10 (.170) .22 (.307) – – 
AfD – .25 (.266) – – 
Supporters of 
other political 
parties .10 (.195) .18 (.169) 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
No party  
supported 
 
.24 
 
(.225) 
 
.33 
 
(.225) 
 
– 
 
– 
Missing values % 4.1 2.5 6.9 5.9 
Total 2064 2041 101 112 
* in brackets: Standard deviation. See question text in Table 3 (0 no confidence at all to 1 a 
great deal of confidence)- 
 
What about the parties that have not governed recently? Among the citizens, 
the A’90/The Greens, the coalition partner of Schroeder’s Red-Green govern-
ment, reach generalized confidence levels close to the parties discussed above 
(citizens T1 .29, T2 .32; MPs T1 .46, T2 .59). Of the parties that had entered 
parliament at the time of our study the PDS/The Left harbored the lowest level 
of support. Among citizens, the supporters of the right-wing NPD (T1 .10; T2 
.22), the newly emerging AfD (T2 .25) and the group of ‘other’ political parties 
showed the lowest levels of confidence in political parties. As a matter of 
course these partisans did not mean their own party when expressing low con-
fidence levels. They most certainly thought of the parties of the ‘old system’. 
This may be regarded as an early indicator signaling a challenge from the 
populist right which Germany is experiencing in the times to come. The posi-
tive news is that citizens not mentioning a party they would vote for in the next 
general election show generalized support levels close to the overall averages 
(T1 .24; T2 .33). 
All in all we are in a position to report that confidence in political parties has 
grown. This warrants the conclusion that political parties command enough 
generalized support in the populace to keep the government-opposition mecha-
nism intact. And this, as has been mentioned above, is not in support of the 
hypothesis that the impact of the fiscal crisis and the economic recession has 
had a long-term negative impact on generalized support for political parties as 
the major actors of the German democratic regime. The European Social Sur-
vey provides time series data which show that these estimates are well in line 
with our cultural ‘normality’ hypothesis (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: Generalized Confidence in Political Parties 
 
Source: European Social Survey (2-8), WVS T1, T2. 
7.  Patterns of Support for Democracy 
Fuchs has proposed three hierarchically ordered levels of a democratic system. 
It is implicit that the highest level, support for democratic values, is also the 
most important for the persistence of a democratic system. There is little argu-
ment that high levels of support are a precondition for the persistence of a 
particular democratic regime, too, although there should be some room for 
institutional change. And, finally, generalized support for political parties 
should be high enough to ensure the interplay of government and opposition.   
For an established (‘old’) democracy we would expect a support pattern that 
shows a large consensus regarding democratic values and a solid majority in 
favor of the country’s democratic regime. It is more difficult to specify the 
appropriate level of generalized support for political parties. In a pragmatic 
sense we could argue that current levels of generalized support of political 
parties are compatible with a competitive party system. Our population surveys 
show confidence levels of .29 (WVS T1) and .37 (WVS T2) on average. Sup-
port for specific parties reaches 69 percent in 2006 (WVS T1) and 73 percent in 
2013 (WVS T2). Official turnout figures for the federal elections closest to our 
fieldwork are 77.7 (2005) and 71.5 percent (2013) respectively. Needless to say 
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that this inductive reasoning does not relieve us from developing theoretically 
grounded criteria to specify the upper and lower boundaries of the ideal gener-
alized support levels for political parties. 
As far as levels of support for democracy are concerned we assume that the 
pattern described above should be characteristic for an established democracy. 
In addition we expect that change of support levels increases as we move from 
values to actors. And this is, indeed, what we find. As documented in Figure 3 
both rank orders of support levels and degrees of change confirm hypothesis 
four. 
Figure 3: Patterns of Support for Democracy (averages, scale values 0-1) 
 
Values: Having a democratic system is a good way of governing this country. 
Regime: How democratically is this country being governed today? 
Actors: How much confidence do you have in political parties? 
MP T1: Members of parliament survey 1, fieldwork: February to August 2007 
MP T2: Members of parliament survey 2, fieldwork: February 2013 to February 2014 
WVS T1: Population survey 1, fieldwork: May to June 2006 
WVS T2: Population survey 2, fieldwork: July to November 2013 
 
We have not specified any expectations regarding the relative distance between 
support for democratic values, the democratic regime and generalized support 
for political parties. Empirically we find that for the population the difference 
between support for democratic values and support for the German democratic 
regime is smaller than the difference between the support for the German dem-
ocratic regime and generalized support for political parties. The respective 
figures for the population are .19 and .37 at T1 and .17 and .32 at T2; for mem-
bers of parliament we find .16 and .29 at T1 and .22 and .18 at T2. Institutions 
of the democratic regime need legitimation in terms of democratic values. This 
may explain the smaller distance between these two levels. A theoretical effort 
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is needed to generate sound expectations regarding appropriate distances be-
tween the various support levels. 
We assume that the general pattern found for levels and degree of change 
may be characteristic for an established democracy. It would be in support of 
the expectation that German democracy did not experience a decrease of sup-
port for democracy as a consequence of the fiscal crisis and the subsequent 
economic recession because of a robust democratic political culture. However, 
the national averages may hide the fact that political parties emerge that propa-
gate anti-democratic ideas and propose anti-democratic procedures. Tables 8.1 
and 8.2 present the relevant figures at the party level for the population and the 
members of parliament respectively. 
Table 8.1: Patterns of Support for Democracy by Groups of Party Supporters in 
2006 (WVS T1) and 2013 (WVS T2) 
 
 
Party supporters 
Culture 
Democratic values 
Structure 
Democratic regime 
Actors 
Political parties 
T1 T2 Diff. T1 T2 Diff. T1 T2 Diff 
PDS/The Left (4.6/5.7)* .84 .82 −.02 .48 .62 +.14 .22 .33 +.11 
A90/The Greens  
(8.0/8 A.2) .89 .88 −.01 .66 .71 +.05 .29 .32 +.03 
SPD (23.1)/23.4) .86 .84 −.02 .69 .68 -.01 .32 .40 +.08 
FDP (4.2/2.4) .84 .90 +.06 .63 .71 +.08 .30 .41 +.11 
CDU/CSU (26.6/29.4) .86 .89 +.03 .70 .75 +.05 .33 .41 +.08 
NPD (1.4/0.8) .74 .71 −.03 .51 .53 +.02 .10 .22 +.12 
AfD (–/1.6)  .82  .59    .25  
Other parties (0.7/1.3) .83 .93 .+.10 .41 .57 +.16 .10 .18 +.08 
No party support 
(31.3/27.1) .84 .86 +.02 .65 .66 +.01 .24 .33 +.09 
Population mean .85 .86 +.01 .66 .69 +.03 .29 .37 +.08 
Std. dev. .21 .21  .22 .20 .23 .23  
Missing values .032 .013  .017 .017 .041 .025  
Total N 2064 2041  2064 2041  2064 2041  
Proportion of party supporters (WVS T1, WVS T2, weighted). 
 
We consider eight groups of party supporters in the populace, seven at T1 and 
eight at T2. The general pattern described for the populace as a whole repeats 
itself in all 15 instances. This is also true for respondents who don’t support a 
political party both for levels and changes of support for democracy. There is a 
high commitment to democratic values well above an average of .80 at both 
periods in time with the exception of the right-wing National Democratic Party 
that scores about ten points lower. When acknowledging that supporters of the 
NPD do command just one percent of the electorate at that time there is little 
reason to be concerned. However, both their belief systems as well as their 
electoral fortunes may change. 
Support for the German democratic regime is lower than support for demo-
cratic values by about 18 points. While we observe larger increases in support 
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for the German democratic regime by the smaller ‘other’ parties (+.16), the 
PDS/The Left (+.14) and the FDP (+.08) the general picture shows levels of 
regime support around .69 and signals little change. Change figures are gener-
ally in the direction of a higher support for democracy with the exception of the 
SPD supporters who display a stable picture (-.01). Generalized confidence in 
political parties does increase even more. The same pattern shows for the par-
ties in parliament although levels of support are generally higher.  
Table 8.2: Patterns of Support for Democracy by Parties in Parliament in 2007 
(T1) and 2013 (T2) 
 
 
Party supporters 
Culture 
Democratic values 
Structure 
Democratic regime 
Actors 
Political parties 
T1 T2 Diff. T1 T2 Diff. T1 T2 Diff. 
PDS/The Left 1.00 1.00 00 .59 .52 −.07 .36 .47 +.11 
A90/The Greens 1.00   .98 −.02 .83 .75 −.08 .46 .59 +.13 
SPD   .99 1.00 +.01 .85 .78 −.07 .58 .63 +.05 
FDP 1.00   .98 −.02 .82 .84 +.02 .46 .60 +.14 
CDU/CSU   .99 1.00  +.01 .88 .84 −.04 .58 .61 +.03 
Population mean   .99   .99 00 .83 .78 −.05 .54 .60 +.06 
Std. dev.   .05   .04  .14 .17  .17 .18  
Missing values .031 - .010 .080 .069 .059
Total N 101 112  101 112  101 112 
 
What do we learn from these empirical results? We claim to have found for the 
general public and for political elites a support pattern which is congruent with 
a differentiated concept of support for an established democracy. This support 
pattern also shows itself, without any exception, for party voters, non-voters 
and for parties in parliament: 
1) Levels of support for democracy follow the hierarchy of the democratic 
system as proposed by Fuchs. They are highest for support for democrat-
ic values; (b) followed by support for the democratic regime, and (3) by 
generalized support for political parties. 
2) Degrees of change at lower levels in the hierarchy: They are lowest at the 
highest and smallest at the lowest level. 
The findings are congruent with the evaluation of Germany as an established 
liberal democracy measured by the liberal democracy index generated by the 
V-Dem Institute (Coppedge et al. 2011; Maxwell, Marquardt and Lührmann 
2018). Figure 4 shows that scores for Germany remained stable at high levels. 
van Beek et al. (2018, 326) report a score of .808 in 2016 (Rank 12 of 174 
countries) and stability in the period of 2006 to 2016. The detailed pattern, 
broken down by the components of the liberal democracy index, is discussed in 
a comparative context by Berg-Schlosser and Hoffmann-Lange (2018, 50-61). 
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Figure 4: The Development of V-Dem’s Liberal Democracy Index for Germany 
1900-2017 
 
Source: V-Dem Data (version 7). 
 
We are well aware that our results signaling high levels and a differentiated 
pattern of change of support for democracy rest on observations at two points 
in time only. A more detailed series of observations with the appropriate indi-
cators could provide a better empirical base to explain the mechanisms that 
produce, reinforce or change the political culture of an established democracy. 
Although some efforts have been made to locate time series data (Fuchs 1999) 
we are not aware of any data sets that would allow such analysis today.  
After completion of this analysis we have learned that preliminary data of 
the German leg of the new wave of the World Values Survey have become 
available. Christian Welzel was kind enough to share the distributions of our 
three key support indicators. Fieldwork for the most recent World Values Sur-
vey extended from October 2017 to April 2018 that is roughly four years from 
the 2013 survey considered in our study. Average scores for the 2017/18 sam-
ple of the German populace are as follows: Democratic values .92, German 
democratic regime .70, generalized trust in political parties .36. More detailed 
analyses are necessary to draw differentiated conclusions. However, the overall 
picture of levels of support for democracy is well in line with the pattern found 
for an established democratic culture in Germany.    
To help speculate about the short-term interplay between government poli-
cies and support of the democratic regime we provide a graph showing the 
development of positive perceptions of success of government policy (% per-
ceiving the economic situation as ‘good’), the vote intention for the leading 
government party (% vote intention for the ‘CDU/CSU’) and support for the 
democratic regime (% ‘satisfied’ with the way democracy is developing in 
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(our) country). The general picture displayed in Figure 5 seems to support 
Lipset’s (1959, 1966) effectiveness theorem (see also Roller 2005; Fuchs and 
Roller 2018). It suggests that the specific structure of the German democratic 
regime enables successful political decision-making and that the various politi-
cal actors have been capable and prepared to make such decisions most of the 
time. If this assumption is correct there is reason to assume a process of gener-
alization of such positive experiences to higher levels of democratic support. 
This process, we propose, has created diffuse support (Easton 1975) and fed the 
reservoir of positive attitudes towards the regime, shielding it against the dis-
appointments of day-to-day politics and increasing its legitimacy (Wessels 
2016). 
Figure 5: The Generalization of Political Experiences. A Potential Mechanism to 
Generate Support for the Democratic Political Regime 
 
Source: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer 2005-2014, data available at: 
<https://www.gesis.org/en/elections-home/politbarometer/>. 
8.  Conclusions 
Has there been a decline in support for democracy in the aftermath of the 
2007/08 fiscal crisis and the subsequent economic recession? This is the gen-
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eral question we wanted to answer for the German case empirically. The sur-
veys allowed for a comparison of pre- and post-crisis results for a selected set 
of indicators of support for democracy. The analysis relied on a conceptual 
framework proposed by Fuchs who distinguishes three objects of support for 
democracy which are hierarchically ordered: democratic values, the democratic 
regime and democratic actors. We tested the analytical power of this frame-
work by considering levels of support for democracy and degrees of change 
regarding the three objects mentioned above.  
What did we find empirically? First (H1), we did not find a substantial nega-
tive effect of the fiscal crisis and the subsequent economic recession for any of 
the three indicators for the population at large and the members of parliament 
at both points in time. This is also true for groups of party supporters and 
members of the various parties in parliament.  
Second (H2), we propose to explain this important but unexpected finding 
by a cushioning effect of Germany’s established democratic political culture. It 
is true that the contraction of the German economy was one of the sharpest 
deteriorations since World War II. In a comparative perspective other econo-
mies – those of the Baltic countries in particular – had suffered even more so. 
Competent and concerted efforts lead by the governments of the established 
democracies of the European Union helped to keep the financial crisis and the 
subsequent economic recession in check. 
Third (H3), members of parliament for each and every indicator display a 
higher level of support for democracy than ordinary citizens. This is well in 
line with the assumption that members of parliament perceive quite clearly that 
they have achieved their power positions within the institutional framework of 
the German democratic regime. This does not preclude the emergence of ‘anti-
system’ parties. However, in the period of our empirical observation no anti-
system party had made it into parliament.  
Our last hypothesis (H4) predicts a pattern of support for democracy typical 
for an established democracy. It should show: 
1) a very high support for basic democratic values; 
2) a high support for the democratic regime of one’s own country that, how-
ever, leaves room for institutional reform; 
3) and a degree of generalized support for the major political actors of a rep-
resentative democracy such as political parties to allow proper electoral 
competition. 
4-6) It should also show patterns of change over time that are lowest at the 
value level and highest at the actor level with the regime level in between. 
As documented above (Tables 8.1 and 8.2) we have found this pattern of sup-
port for democracy at both points in time and for all groups considered in the 
analysis, citizens, members of parliament, groups of party supporters as well as 
non-party supporters and parties in parliament. Based on the empirical analysis 
we propose to explain the fact that the fiscal crisis and the subsequent econom-
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ic recession had no impact on support for democracy to a large part by Germa-
ny’s established democratic political culture. 
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